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Summary
To trace paths to knowledge or to follow the journey searching for knowledge is to some
extent equivalent to reading a philosophical book. Plato, who perceives this relation be-
tween journey and philosophy, writes his dialogues as if each of his works were a journey
to knowledge. This paper inquires into the ascent and descent motif that is the symbolic
motion of a philosophical journey and appears in Plato’s Politeia repeatedly. By means of
this motif, Plato depicts the journey of the soul in several different ways. This examination
will show a possible way to read Plato’s dialogue as a philosophical journey. This journey
is undertaken by Plato or the ﬁgure Socrates, but at the same time it involves its readers in
philosophical inquiries.
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Das Lesen eines philosophischen Buches kann in einem gewissen Sinne mit einer Weg-
beschreitung oder einer Reise zum Wissen gleichgesetzt werden. Platon, der sich dieses
Verhältnisses zwischen Reise und Philosophie bewusst war, verfasste seine Dialoge, als ob
sie Reisen zum Wissen wären. Diese Abhandlung behandelt das Begriffspaar Aufstieg und
Abstieg, das als symbolische Bewegung der philosophischen Reise in Platons Politeia mehr-
mals verwendet wird. Mit diesem Motiv stellt Platon die Reise der Seele auf unterschiedli-
che Weisen dar. Meine Untersuchung zeigt eine Leseweise, mit der Platons Dialog als phi-
losophische Reise verstanden werden kann, die zwar von Platon oder der Figur Sokrates
unternommen wird, gleichzeitig jedoch den Leser in die philosophischen Fragestellungen
miteinbezieht.
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1 Introduction
At the very end of Plato’s Politeia, Socrates introduces the Story of Er, which is a report
on how souls travel and what they do in the Afterlife. Among several unique elements in
this story, the motifs of anabasis and katabasis, ascent and descent, have attracted scholars’
special attention. These motifs, which are mostly used as a pair, appear repeatedly in the
Politeia.1 The most famous passage in which this paired motif appears is the Allegory
of the Cave in Book 7. In this allegory, a person bound in a cave is depicted as going
up to the outside, and, after a while, returning down to the cave. It is also well known
that the dialogue begins with Socrates’ word ‘kateben’ (I went down), which is sometimes
regarded as an allusion to the Allegory of the Cave.2 If we compare the ﬁrst sentence with
the last sentence, we cannot doubt that Plato uses the ascent–descent motif intentionally.
The aim of this examination is to understand the framework of Plato’s Politeia,
which sustains the entire philosophical discussion expounded in the dialogue from the
perspective of the ascent–descent motif. As the Story of Er shows distinctly, this motif
can be seen as a sign indicating the journey of souls. Depicting the journey of souls on
different levels, Plato tries to illuminate how we are able to set out our philosophical
inquiries, which are likened to journeys.
In the following, I ﬁrst give an overview of the concept of a journey in a philosoph-
ical sense. Then in the second section, I analyze three passages of the Politeia in which
the ascent–descent motif plays the central role. They are, namely, the Story of Er, the
Allegory of the Cave, and the opening scene. The third section compares these passages
so that we can see how they are related to each other. Finally, in the fourth section, I
propose a possible way to read the Politeia as an invitation from Plato, showing the close
1 The English translations taken from the Politeia are
based on Bloom 1991. I have modiﬁed his transla-
tions on occasion. The citations from the original
Greek text are based on Slings 2003.
2 Referring to Proclus’ argument, Burnyeat under-
stands that “Socrates’ going down to the Peiraeus
and being detained there, somewhat reluctantly”
corresponds to “an image of how [...] the philoso-
phers would con–descend, somewhat reluctantly”
Burnyeat 1998, 6.
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connection between the ﬁrst and the last sentence of the dialogue. The whole examina-
tion shall reveal a possible way to interpret the message Plato places in the last sentence
of his second-longest dialogue.
2 Philosophical inquiry as a journey
Before we examine Plato’s Politeia, an overview of the concept of ‘journey’ in general
will help our understanding of the philosophical journey. It is not easy to deﬁne what is
and is not counted as a journey. Besides, the existence of several terms in ancient Greek,
implying a journey in the broad sense, makes this task more complicated.3 Nonetheless,
it is not the main aim of this section to judge which terms belong to the journey category.
Let me ﬁrst loosely deﬁne the concept.
Despite the variety of terms, if a certain word indicates a movement that contains
the following two elements, we possibly understand it under the concept of a journey:
leaving a place with which a person is familiar and acquiring something, whether ma-
terial or intellectual, that could not be found as long as the person stays at the original
location. Using these two conditions, we ﬁnd that journeys in ancient Greek written ma-
terial can be grouped into two categories: (1) a journey in the literal sense includes those
taken by (quasi-) ﬁctional ﬁgures, such as Odysseus, and those reported to be taken by
historic ﬁgures, such as Plato; and (2) a journey in the metaphorical or intellectual sense
does not have to include physical motion but occurs in someone’s mind or intellect,
sometimes in a conversation.
Journey (1) is characterized by a linear movement in general, even though it in-
cludes detours and other adventures. Simpliﬁed, such movements are described as ‘go-
ing there and going back’. People taking this kind of journey, whether they are historical
or ﬁctional, depart from their homelands or the places with which they are familiar and,
after a while, return to the places where they started their travels. This feature also im-
plies that journey (1) has clear aims or destinations. People’s journeys or movements are
eventually the means to reach their destinations and fulﬁll their aims. Consider some
examples. In the Iliad and the Odyssey, Odysseus leaves his homeland to beat the Trojan
enemies. After accomplishing this goal, he tries to return to his homeland. His depar-
ture from his homeland has a clear, simple aim and destination. As another example,
Plato leaves Athens to answer the request of Dion, who wants him to educate (or to do
3 The apparently most famous one is νόστος, which
describes, for example, the process of Odysseus’
return home from Troy to Ithaca (cf. Od. 1.5). In




philosophy with) the young tyrant of Syracuse.4 This goal is not attained in the way that
Plato wishes, and he returns to Athens in despair. Nevertheless, his journey has a clear
aim and destination.
In contrast, journey (2) does not necessarily include linear movement. Plato’s philo-
sophical journey can be pictured with the zigzag motion or the dialectic (dialektische
Aufhebung).5 This difference in the motion can originate from the clarity of the aims
that are set in the journeys. The destinations of philosophical journeys are usually quite
vague, especially in the case of Plato’s so-called aporetic dialogues. Unlike journey (1),
people who attempt to go on journey (2) are unsure of what they could retain by under-
taking it. Their only aim is to escape the situation where they are trapped in dark and
blurred knowledge. Note that this aim differs from that of attaining new knowledge.
Those who endeavor to take the philosophical journey do not know at the beginning
whether it will be able to bring them something new. This special character entails a
tricky problem on its own.
This difficulty is introduced in Plato’s Meno in the form of the paradox of philosoph-
ical inquiries referred to by Meno, who is familiar with the “eristic argument” (Meno
80d–e).6 The point of the paradox is that we cannot search for a thing if we do not know
what it is. Even if we were to ﬁnd it, we cannot recognize it as the object of our search.
Otherwise, if we are able to identify it as such, it necessarily means that we have already
known what we are looking for. Hence, the method of philosophical inquiries leads to
‘puzzlement’ (aporia).
Comparing this paradox to our previous observation, we notice that the puzzlement
that the paradox leads to characterizes the uniqueness of the philosophical journey. The
question that Meno asks Socrates can be formulated as follows and is also directed to
those who attempt to make a philosophical journey: how can we take a journey, although
we do not have a clear, particular destination? This question does not serve as a spiteful
means to refute the inclusion of the philosophical journey under the broader concept of
a journey. Rather, its function is to caution; it warns that an intellectual inquiry – that
is, the philosophical journey – is unlike a treasure hunt through which someone will
discover something given externally.
Related to this point, it should also be noted that the end of a philosophical journey
differs from that of journey (1). While journey (1) ends with the return to the traveler’s
4 The whole story of Plato’s travel to Syracuse is re-
ported in his Seventh Letter.
5 The hypothetic method of inquiries (Phaid. 100b–
102a) and the dialectic (Rep. 532b–535a) can be de-
picted with the zigzag motion.
6 Socrates himself does not view the paradox as a well-
formulated argument. He develops the theory of
recollection as the solution or its opposing argu-
ment to the paradox after the particular passage.
Regarding this paradox, Klein mentions the differ-
ence between ‘searching’ and ‘learning’. Klein 1965,
90–92. The English translation of Meno is based on
Sedly and Long 2011.
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homeland, namely the place found comfortable, journey (2) ends by reaching the place
found uncomfortable, even if it is one’s homeland. After the philosophical journey, it is
almost impossible to return to the original position from which the journey started.
Despite some peculiarities of journey (2), as long as the movements contain the
two previously mentioned elements, we can understand them under the concept of a
journey.7 If we observe the ascent–descent motif from the perspective of the concept of
a journey sketched above, it appears not merely as a repeated motif but as the decisive
element that builds the entire dialogue of the Politeia as a philosophical journey.
3 Three passages where the ascent–descent motif appears
This section concentrates on the examination of three passages of the Politeia where the
ascent–descent motif appears: the Story of Er in Book 10, the Allegory of the Cave in
Book 7, and the opening scene in Book 1. Let’s start our inquiry into Plato’s own text.
3.1 The story of Er
Although it is placed at the end of the dialogue, it seems apt to examine ﬁrst the Story
(μῦθος) of Er because it describes the journey of souls more clearly than the two other
passages. Brieﬂy, this story has two purposes: to let people know the rewards and pun-
ishments that souls shall receive after their bodily deaths and to encourage people to
live justly. Instead of telling it simply, Socrates introduces it as a story reported by Er,
a “brave man” who died in war (614b3). In the following paragraphs, I focus on two
elements of this story: the journey of the soul(s) and Er’s role as a messenger.
First, consider the description of the journey of Er’s soul. According to Er, his soul
“made a journey (πορεύεσθαι) in the company of many” after it left his body (614b8–c1).
Er’s death itself is portrayed as a journey. Although such a depiction was not unknown
at that time,8 it is noteworthy that the journey of his soul is not expressed with any
word relating to the image of a descent. It implies that Socrates intentionally changes the
7 Plato lets the character Socrates describe his in-
quiry by comparing it with “the second voyage”
(ὁ δεύτερος πλόος) in the Phaedo. When Socrates
heard that Anaxagoras explains intelligence (νοῦς)
as “the cause of everything”, Socrates was pleased
(Phd. 97b8–c6). However, after examining the ar-
gument of Anaxagoras, he is “swept away from his
marvelous expectations” (Phd. 98b7) and decided to
pursue his “second voyage” (Phd. 99c9–d1). For the
Greek text, I use Burnet 1900. The English transla-
tion is based on Sedly and Long 2011.
8 For example, Herodotus reports the reincarnation
(Seelenwanderung) as follows: “The Egyptians were
the ﬁrst who maintained the following doctrine,
too, that the human soul is immortal, and at the
death of the body enters into some other living




place of the afterlife that Homer offered and Homer’s followers had inherited.9 Socrates
does not depict the world of the dead as a place under the earth; it is no longer the
underworld.10 The journey of Er’s soul ended when his soul “came back to his body”
(621b6). However, the journey of the soul(s) portrayed in the story concerns not only
Er but also others. Er reports how the souls of others make their journeys. Those who
are judged to have lived justly go “up” (ἄνω) to the sky and enjoy rewards and happiness,
while those who are judged to have lived unjustly go “under” (κάτω) the earth and re-
ceive punishments and torment (614c3–d1). After a thousand-year journey, they gather
again. The just souls that rose to the sky “come down” (καταβαίνειν), while the un-
just ones “go up” (ἀνιέναι) (614d6–e1). The journey of souls in the afterlife is explicitly
illustrated by the ascent–descent motif.
The other important point in the story is the role of messenger, which Er plays.
The judges who render a decision for each soul inform Er that “he ha[s] to become a
messenger to human beings (ἄγγελος ἀνθρώποις) of the things” in the afterlife, “and
they [tell] him to listen and to look at everything in the place” (614d1–3). A few pages
later, he is again called “the messenger from that place” (ὁ ἐκεῖθεν ἄγγελος) (619b2). Er
is instructed to become the messenger, as well as the witness to the truth of the afterlife.
To know the truth, humans are in need of a messenger who tells the truth to others
and who “save[s]” (σώζειν) the story (621b8).11 This point is decisive if we consider it
together with the previous one. As already stated, Plato – or Socrates as the storyteller
– seems intentionally to change the picture of the afterlife that has been inherited from
Homer and his followers. To tell a new type of journey of the soul, Plato calls neither
Odysseus nor Orpheus, who have both been accepted as messengers from the afterlife,
but Er as a new messenger.12
In this way, Er’s story pictorially represents the journey that all souls are fated to
take after leaving their bodies. Souls in this story are depicted to some extent as having a
close relation with the bodies in which they once dwelled because they are able to move
physically, upwards and downwards, at least as far as Socrates – or the original narrator
9 Socrates names “tragedy and its leader, Homer” as
those who are said to “know all arts and all things
human ... and the divine things too” (598d8–e2).
10 Männlein-Robert emphasizes this point: Männlein-
Robert 2014, 55; Männlein-Robert 2016. Some pas-
sages imply that the world of the dead is somewhere
in or above the sky, which can be compared with
the image of the Christian heaven. This world-view
is also shared in the soul-chariot allegory of the Phae-
drus (246a–254e). Additionally, the astronomical ob-
servations seem to reinforce the image of the world
of the dead as placed somewhere in or above the sky.
11 Halliwell comments on the word ‘save’ as follows:
“The presumable point is that most tales ‘perish’
as soon as they are told; Plato’s sow a seed that can
grow in us.” Halliwell 1988, 193.
12 Männlein-Robert’s view supports this point: “An-
ders als Odysseus gelangt er jedoch nicht ab-
sichtlich, sondern als zufällig ausgewählter Bote
dorthin. Sein nüchterner Botebericht wird im Kon-
text der Politeia vom Philosophen Sokrates referiert
und dezidiert als Gegenstück zur homerischen Lü-
genmärchengeschichte des mythischen Helden
Odysseus beschrieben” (Männlein-Robert 2014, 56).
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Er – describes them. This ‘saved’ story becomes known through the mouth of a brave
warrior, a “randomly selected messenger”.13
3.2 Allegory of the cave
Let us move on to examine a passage found in Book 7: the Allegory of the Cave. It is
undoubtedly one of the climaxes of the dialogue.14 In the following paragraphs, we read
the text step by step, paying attention to three points that are important for our inquiry:
the bound state of prisoners, the compulsion of ascent, and the compulsion of descent.
Socrates begins the allegory with the description of bound people or “prisoners”
(δεσμῶται) in the cave to “make an image of our nature in its education and want of
education” (514a1–2). Their necks and legs are bound. Therefore, they are unable to
ﬂee from the cave and to “turn” (περιάγειν) their heads around (514b1–3). As a result,
their heads are always directed toward the wall. A ﬁre is burning behind them; between
them and the ﬁre lies a “path” (ὁδός) on which human beings carry all sorts of artifacts
(514b3–7). Due to this environment, the prisoners always see only shadows on the wall
and believe that these are real. Additionally, since voices and sounds, which originally
come from things moving on the path between the ﬁre and the prisoners, echo against
the wall, they believe that these voices and sounds come from the shadows (515b7–9).
This is “our nature” (ἡ ἡμετέρα φύσις) (514a1–2). It shows how much humans’ visual
and auditory perceptions are deceived. Note that people are already “under the earth”
(ἐν καταγείῳ) in the cave (514a3), although Socrates does not mention how they have
descended to the cave. This means assumedly that humans are generally born with visual
and auditory senses that are often hindrances to attaining a higher form of existence.
The second and the third points concern the hypothetical experiment of what hap-
pens to the prisoners when released from their yokes. This experiment begins with the
scene depicting “someone” (τις) attempting to release a bound person.15 After doing so,
this someone “suddenly compels (ἀναγκάζοιτο) him to stand up (ἀνίστασθαι), to turn
his neck around, to walk and look up (ἀναβλέπειν) toward the light” (515c6–8). The
prisoner is forced to do all of the acts that he could never attempt in his bound state.
The contrast between the prisoner’s situation and what “someone” compels the prisoner
to do distinctly illustrates how demanding the ﬁrst stage of the liberation is. However,
the liberation process has just begun. Subsequently, someone “drags him away from the
cave by force (βίᾳ) along the rough, steep, upwards way (ἀνάβασις)” (515e5). In this
13 Männlein-Robert 2014, 56.
14 If we follow Szlezák’s argument, the Politeia is con-
structed symmetrically, putting Books 5 to 7 at the
center. See Szlezák 1984, 38; Szlezák and Rufner
2000, 920–922.
15 Here, both the person who attempts to release and
the person who is released are written in the singu-
lar form. For example τις and αὐτῳ at 515d2.
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sentence again, using words such as “by force”, “rough”, and “steep”, Socrates empha-
sizes the difficulty of getting away from the cave. This hardship reﬂects the requirement
of “someone” who compels – but actually helps – the prisoners, because without this
someone, the prisoners never dare to escape from the cave. As far as Socrates describes
the situation, there is no chance for the prisoners to “stand up” and “turn [their] necks
around” by themselves. As a result, nothing ‘outside’ of the cave exists for them. The
presence of this someone, who remains anonymous,16 corresponds to the existence of
the world outside the cave. Thus, the passage regarding the prisoner’s liberation includes
two signiﬁcant messages; the liberation must be compelled by someone and its process
is extremely difficult. As shown, the liberation process is characterized by an ascending
motion, suggested by the words “stand up”, “look up”, and “upwards way”.
The latter part of the hypothetical experiment involves the return of the people who
have been released and have gone outside the cave. After staying outside, “they are not
willing to mind the business of human beings (τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων), but … their souls
are always eager to spend their time above (ἄνω)” (517c6–d1). If they go back down
to the cave, they have to “contest about shadows of justice” with others who still and
always will remain in the cave (517d6–9). The discomfort of returning to the cave is not
limited to this aspect, however. If those released attempt to liberate other prisoners so
that the latter group can also enjoy what the former has savored outside, the latter group
resists the former’s efforts; the prisoners “would kill” those who attempt to release them
(517a6). Therefore, the released group’s unwillingness to return to the cave originates
not only from simple comfort but also from the danger of dying. Nevertheless, the peo-
ple who have been outside the cave are neither allowed to “remain” (καταμένειν) there
nor “be unwilling to go down again” (ἐθέλειν πάλιν καταβαίνειν) (519d4–5). Just as
people were compelled to turn their necks around and to go up after they were liber-
ated, now they are forced again to return to the cave. This passage, which seems to hint
at Socrates’ death sentence, is also characterized by the compulsory turn from comfort
to discomfort.17 Contrasted to the former one, this turn is described with the descent
motion (καταβαίνειν).
Thus, the Allegory of the Cave depicts the ascent–descent motif on two different
levels. On one hand, it presents a concrete image of the cave and the prisoners who are
16 We may regard this ‘someone’ as Socrates himself.
Männlein-Robert explains this ‘someone’ by com-
parison with Odysseus, arguing: “Wie Odysseus
seine Geschichte, in der er als Οὖτις/ ,Niemand‘
erforderlich aus der Höhle entkommt, selbst erzählt,
so erzählt auch Sokrates sein Höhlengleichnis mit
dem τις/ ,Jemand‘ der aus der Höhle aufsteigen und
herausführen kann, selbst (auch der Armenier Er
erzählt das eigene Ergebnis)” (Männlein-Robert
2013, 249).
17 Unlike the ascent, we do not know whether those
who go back down to the cave will ﬁnd comfort
there again. Glaucon deﬁnes life in the cave as
“worse” (χεῖρον) than that outside it (519d8–9).
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bound under the earth, released, and then led above; this is the level of the image.18 On
the other hand, the ascent described here does not actually indicate physical movements.
Socrates argues that it explains not simply the “twirling of a shell” (στροφή) but “the
turning of a soul around (ψυχῆς περιαγωγή) from a day that is like night to the true day”
(521c5–7). Since the allegory is deﬁned as “the turning of a soul”, we can also understand
the ascending motion in a metaphorical sense. Therefore, it indicates that the incidents
described in the allegory actually happen interiorly to human beings, or more precisely,
in their souls. Unlike the Story of Er, a soul is able to experience ascent and descent
without dying.19 However, the situation where the liberated are placed is tenser than
that faced by Er, for in the worst case, death awaits those who are released. This death
may also indicate something that should be understood ﬁguratively, but in any case, the
descent clearly involves painful discomfort, which is not mentioned in the Story of Er.
Nonetheless, the compulsory moment of descent plays a signiﬁcant role in the opening
scene.
3.3 Opening scene
We can ﬁnd a clear representation of the descent motif in the opening scene (327a1–
328e7). In relation to the previous examinations, three points should be noted: the motif
of descent in the ﬁrst line, the compulsion by Polemarchus, and Cephalus’ request.
Let us start by reading the ﬁrst line: “I went down to Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon,
son of Ariston” (κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος; 327a1–2).
To reiterate, the very ﬁrst word of the dialogue is κατέβην (I went down). However, the
place where Socrates heads to is neither the underworld nor the cave but the port city
Piraeus. A. Bloom comments as “the center of Athenian commerce, it was the place to
ﬁnd all the diversity and disorder that come from foreign lands”.20 Piraeus is the point
where diverse cultures and viewpoints meet. The ﬁrst sentence further includes two
details that attract our attention. First, the whole story is introduced as an incident that
occurred “yesterday”. The narrator Socrates always tells the story to his interlocutors, as
well as the readers of the Politeia, in the time frame of “today”. Second, Socrates went
down to Piraeus “with Glaucon”, which means that Socrates’ descent is not solitary. This
18 In the beginning of the allegory, Socrates says,
“Next, then, ... make an image (ἀπείκασον) of our
nature in its education and want of education, liken-
ing it to a condition of the following kind” (514a1–
2, emphasis added).
19 However, we can also ﬁnd a point shared with the
Story of Er, where death is depicted as a soul’s jour-
ney, equivalent to the departure from its body or its
physical material. In the Allegory of the Cave, the
cave is pictured as a place where visual and auditory
perceptions interrupt a person’s way upwards or
paths to knowledge. Thus, the liberation from the
cave can be compared with death as the departure
from the body. This must be the reason why phi-
losophy is called “practicing dying” in the Phaedo
(67e5).
20 Bloom 1991, 440–441.
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point seems different from the situation of the released who is portrayed as going back
down alone among the prisoners in the cave.21 Additionally, the person accompanied
by Socrates is Glaucon, “son of Ariston”, who is one of Plato’s brothers. Plato is also a
“son of Ariston”.22
The second noteworthy point in the opening scene is the compulsion by Pole-
marchus. Polemarchus “ordered” (ἐκέλευσε) his slave boy to “order” (κελεῦσαι) Socrates
and Glaucon to wait for him (327b3–4). As the author, Plato quotes the boy’s words
again, “The boy said, ‘Polemarchus orders (κελεύει) you to wait’” (327b5).23 Plato uses
the word “order” three times in three lines to emphasize the compulsory character of
Polemarchus’ words. This compulsion appears more powerful when Polemarchus forces
Socrates to choose between two options: either Socrates and Glaucon “prove [them-
selves] stronger” than Polemarchus and his companions or “stay” with Polemarchus
(327c9–11). Polemarchus also adds that Socrates will fail to “persuade” (πεῖσαι) him to
let Socrates go because he has no desire to listen to Socrates’ opinion at all. Since Socrates
and Glaucon actually have no choice other than staying with Polemarchus and his com-
panions, Glaucon (not Socrates) decides to follow them to Polemarchus’ house.24 Note
that the descent to Piraeus is not against Socrates’ will because he himself went there
for the purpose of observing the Thracian festival. However, this descent by “turning
around” (μετεστράφην) (327b6) and “staying” in Piraeus is against his will.
We can ﬁnd one more compulsory element in Cephalus’ words, which appear more
moderate than those of his son Polemarchus. Cephalus complains that Socrates does
not come down (θαμίζειν καταβαίνων) to him in Piraeus very often, which is what he
“should” (χρῆν) actually do (328c6). Cephalus’ grievance against Socrates suggests that
they normally live in different places. Cephalus resides somewhere ‘down there’, while
Socrates dwells somewhere ‘above’. Although Piraeus is the crossing point of ‘down’ and
‘above’, the fact that Socrates and Glaucon meet Polemarchus and Cephalus in the port
city and that Cephalus requests that Socrates come down hint at the difficulty for those
down there to go above. Cephalus repeats his request at the end of the same passage,
“Come here regularly (φοίτα) to us as to friends and your very own kin” (ὡς παρὰ φί-
λους τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους) (328d5–7). Cephalus shows his will to become like Socrates’
“friends” and his “very own kin”, whom Socrates visits often.
The opening scene attracts the readers’ attention to the descending movement with
its very ﬁrst word, although we cannot ﬁnd its corresponding movement (i.e., the ascent)
21 An example is “if such a man (ὁ τοιοῦτος) were to
come down again” (516e3–4). On the other hand,
it is possible that there are some people who are re-
leased and go outside the cave, because Socrates says
“not to permit them (αὐτοῖς) what is now permit-
ted” (519d2).
22 If we accept that the emphasis is placed on the “son
of Ariston”, we may be able to consider Plato the
actual companion of Socrates in this descent.
23 Szlezák 1985, 273–275.
24 Szlezák 1985, 272.
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in Book 1. The situation under which Socrates and Glaucon are placed, confronting
Polemarchus who compels them to stay down there, reminds us of the circumstances
surrounding those who are liberated and then return to the cave. However, unlike the
prisoners who attempt to kill the liberated, the elderly man down in Piraeus expects to
become like the ‘friends’ of Socrates. Although the same motif of descent is used in the
allegory and in the opening scene, these two passages create opposite impressions.
4 Comparison of the three passages
So far, we have read three passages from the Politeia, using the ascent–descent motif as a
clue. First, let me summarize them from the perspective of the concept of a journey so
that we can understand how the three separate passages are interrelated.
The Story of Er depicts how souls take their journeys, with ascending and descend-
ing motions. In other words, the ascent–descent motif connotes the journey(s) of the
soul(s) in the Politeia. The narrative is told as a true story through the messenger Er.
His soul’s journey enables him to convey a new and true perspective on the afterlife,
which differs from the widely held view.25 Er’s role as a messenger suggests that the
journey, especially that of souls, brings people new Weltanschauung, which can be called
‘knowledge’ in the broad sense.
The ascent–descent motif that we sporadically ﬁnd in the Story of Er appears in
the Allegory of the Cave in a clearer way. If we compare the ascending and descending
motions of the released with the description of the movements of souls in Er’s story,
the process of liberation from the bound state in the cave can be interpreted as a sort of
journey. Er, who is released from his body, journeys to the afterlife and after acquiring a
new perspective, returns to deliver the message; that is, the new Weltanschauung, which
will never be obtained as long as one’s soul is detained in one’s body.
Similarly, the opening scene can be regarded as illustrating part of the journey be-
cause the descent motif appears quite obviously there. While the journey beginning in
the opening scene completely differs from the other two journeys, it is often said that
Plato alludes to the Allegory of the Cave and the bitter fate awaiting the people released
from the cave in the beginning of the dialogue.26 The descent motif and the description
of Socrates being compelled to stay can easily be associated with the same images ap-
pearing in the last half of the allegory. Indeed, the opening scene and the allegory share
some points in terms of the descent motif. Socrates is not allowed to stay someplace
25 Regarding this point, Halliwell argues: “It is, in ef-
fect, a reinvented myth, and as such one contribu-
tion to Plato’s larger project of (re)appropriating
the medium of myth for his own philosophical pur-
poses.” Halliwell 2007, 447.
26 For example Burnyeat 1998, 6.
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“above” and is compelled to “stay” at the place where people live with others. What is
contested in the house of Cephalus can be understood as shadows of justice because the
interlocutors of Socrates cannot discover a ﬁrm deﬁnition of justice in the conversation
made in Book 1 of the Politeia. Cephalus’ house, where Socrates and Glaucon have just
arrived, seems to possess the same characteristics as the cave, where the prisoners com-
pete for the best “knowledge” about shadows, and the surroundings of Er, whose soul
has just returned to his body.
However, if we focus too much on the common points, we will lose sight of what
the journey in the beginning of the whole dialogue actually is. First, we should not for-
get one crucial difference between the opening scene and the allegory. Speciﬁcally, the
people in Cephalus’ house do not try to kill Socrates, while the bound people in the
cave would “get their hands on and kill the man who attempts to release and lead up”
those who are released and try to liberate other prisoners (517a4–6).27 On the contrary,
Cephalus requests that Socrates come down and visit him and his company often (θαμί-
ζειν and φοιτᾶν). What, then, does Cephalus’ readiness bring to the journey of Socrates
and Glaucon?
To explore this point more precisely, a small excursion to other Platonic texts will
be helpful. We can ﬁnd an expression similar to Cephalus’ words in the Laches, one of
Plato’s earlier aporetic dialogues. Lysimachus, who had not met Socrates until the day
of the dialogue, says to Socrates, “You ought to have visited us often and thought [of] us
as your kin” (181c1–2).28 After they become acquainted, Lysimachus says that Socrates
should visit him and his company, so they can keep their friendship (φίλια). Needless
to say, Lysimachos’ words, “to visit us often” (φοιτᾶν) and “to think of us as your kin”
(οἰκείους ἡγεῖσθαι), are equivalent to those of Cephalus.
In the beginning of the dialogue, he promises his interlocutors twice that he will
“speak frankly” (παρρησιάζεσθαι) (178a4–5, 179c1–2). After becoming acquainted with
Socrates, he asks Socrates to regard him as “one of your best-willing friends” (εὐνούστα-
τόν σοι) (181b8–c1). Lysimachos emphasizes his two essential traits: frankness (παρρη-
σία) and goodwill (εὔνοια). Michel Foucault argues that in this text we can “see the
series of precautions taken to set up the conditions, the zone of truth-telling”.29 To put it
another way, these attributes constitute the preconditions or requisites for those who try
to acquire truth. In the Gorgias as well, frankness and goodwill are counted as two of the
three qualities that Socrates demands of a person “who would sufficiently test (βασανί-
27 As Bloom mentions, the opening scene could be an
allusion to Socrates’ trial. Bloom 1991, 310. How-
ever, as I point out later, even Thrasymachus does
not try to kill Socrates.
28 For the Greek text of the Laches, I use Burnet 1903.
The English translation of the Laches is based on
Jowett 1931.
29 Foucault, Ewald, and Burchell 2011, 128–130.
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ζειν) a soul” (487a1–3).30 The settings of the Laches and the Gorgias prepare the space that
enables “a permanent test of the soul, a basanos (test) of the soul”, in Foucault’s words.31
Note that these characteristics only offer the space necessary for the emergence of truth.
They do not guarantee that dialogues between people with these traits will necessarily
produce or discover truth.
Returning to the Politeia, if we read the compulsion and the request of Polemarchus
and Cephalus from the perspective not only of the Allegory of the Cave but also of
“a basanos (test) of the soul”, we can ﬁnd an ideal setting for philosophical inquiries in
Cephalus’ house. Thus, Socrates and Glaucon’s descending journey, originally against
Socrates’ will, begins to acquire a color different from the descent that those released
from the cave would experience. While Socrates narrates the allegory conveying the bit-
ter fate of the released, his own descent is heading in another direction that does not
lead to that bitter fate. What then is Plato’s aim in depicting the discordance between
what Socrates tells in the form of an allegory and the situation where Socrates is placed?
5 An invitation from Plato
As mentioned above, the descent motif represented with κατέβην can be associated with
the journey of the soul, just as the Story of Er shows. But at the same time, when it ap-
pears with a compulsory element, the close connection between the opening scene and
the Allegory of the Cave will be emphasized. It is not difficult to regard Socrates head-
ing to Piraeus as parallel to the liberated prisoner returning to the cave. On the other
hand, Cephalus’ eagerness to be in Socrates’ company seems to suggest that something
different from the bitter fate that the liberated would suffer is awaiting the ﬁgure of
Socrates in the Politeia. By preparing the house of Cephalus, Plato endeavors to write
another scenario, which is different not only from the fate awaiting the liberated in the
allegory, but also from the real misfortune that befell Socrates.32 The following investi-
gation shall explain why we can see that the descent of Socrates depicted in the opening
scene hints at another fate for the prisoners liberated from the cave, paying attention to
the concept of a journey that was the original starting point of our entire inquiry.
As previously stated, the character of Cephalus makes the opening scene distinct
from the other two passages. His frankness and goodwill secure the space for the “basanos
(test) of a soul”. Perhaps Thrasymachus, the main interlocutor in Book 1, plays a role
30 The rest is episteme or knowledge. Socrates tells this
to Callicles, who is one of the most hostile ﬁgures in
Plato’s dialogues. For the Greek text of the Gorgias, I
use Burnet 1903.
31 Foucault, Gros, and Burchell 2010, 366–367.
32 Socrates was sentenced to death for impiety against




similar to that of those who “get their hands on and kill the man who attempts to release
and lead up” the prisoners. He is indeed aggressive toward Socrates: he “hunched up like
a wild beast, he ﬂung himself at us as if to tear us to pieces” (336b5–6). But thanks to
the secured space prepared by Cephalus and the dialectical conversation with Socrates,
Thrasymachus becomes gradually calm and ﬁnally shows his willingness to listen to
Socrates.33
Although the house of Cephalus is portrayed as an appropriate space for the philo-
sophical inquiry Socrates is undertaking, it should be stressed that it is merely the start-
ing point of the philosophical journey. The house where Socrates’ interlocutors gather
is not a ὁδός (path) on the journey. Now let’s focus on how Socrates uses the word ὁδός
in the opening scene.
After Cephalus requests Socrates visit him in Piraeus more often, Socrates answers,
“I am really delighted to discuss with the very old …, one ought, in my opinion, to
learn from them what sort of path (τινὰ ὁδόν) it is” (328d8–e2). Here, Socrates com-
pares one’s life, or way of life, to ὁδός. The literal meaning of ὁδός is ‘path’ or ‘road’, but
here Socrates uses this word in a very metaphorical sense. Its meaning is almost equiva-
lent to ‘life’; to walk the path means growing old and living one’s life. In this sense, the
old Cephalus represents one of the predecessors whose footsteps will be followed by the
younger people. The path, as life, is not homogeneous for all people. Each person walks
his/her own path, but there are several types of paths. The path of Cephalus is charac-
terized by his piety, because in the middle of the discussion Cephalus leaves to “offer
a sacriﬁce to the divine” (331d10). While this behavior seems to portray Cephalus as a
devout old man, it can also be regarded as evidence of him being afraid of the afterlife,
whose image has been brought to him by the stories he has heard since his childhood.34
Thus, Cephalus is often seen as a ﬁgure representing those with conservative views of
the afterlife.35
Socrates chooses another path on which Cephalus has not walked. On one hand,
Socrates cannot follow the footsteps of Cephalus, because Cephalus leaves Socrates and
other younger ones, although he was eager to talk with Socrates. Many prevailing stories
concerning the afterlife hinder Cephalus from listening to the message delivered by
Socrates and, as a result, from walking the path Socrates is to walk. On the other hand,
Socrates does not choose the path Cephalus has chosen, because he has already chosen
33 Thrasymachus urges Socrates to continue talking
about the regime at 450a–b.
34 This point is clearly shown in the following words
of Cephalus: “The tales told about what is in Hades
... at which he laughed up to then, now make his
soul twist and turn because he fears they might be
true” (330d7–e2). As to this point, my understand-
ing relies largely on Lear’s following comment:
“[Cephalus] can now recognize the Achilles tale
as a story, but the tale has already done its psychic
work. And by the time he tries in adulthood to
think about what courage is, he is already looking
out from Achilles’ perspective.” (Lear 2006, 30).
35 For example Blackburn 2006, 28.
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another path, which leads upwards. Socrates stayed in Piraeus to show this upward path
to his interlocutors.
Yet, an inconsistency appears here. If we assume that the ascent–descent motif de-
scribed in the allegory is a model of the philosophical journey, the inquiry into justice is
supposed to be described with an ascending motion. Thus, I now propose the following
interpretation: Socrates needs to descend so that he may ascend with friends with whom
he is capable of acquiring a new Weltanschauung. This interpretation is supported by the
last sentence of the Politeia, where Socrates says, “We shall always keep to the upper path”
(τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ ἀεὶ ἑξόμεθα) (621c4–5). We can associate this expression with the upward
way in the cave, which leads to the entrance (or the exit) of the cave (515e6). The “up-
per path” indicates the path leading to the outside of the cave, the yoke of ignorance. I
believe we are allowed to regard this upper path in the last sentence as corresponding
to the descent in the ﬁrst sentence.
The difference between the ﬁrst and the last sentence is, however, not only the direc-
tion. The last sentence has the verb ἑξόμεθα (‘we shall keep’ or ‘we will have’), whereas
Socrates uses κατέβην (‘I went down’) in the opening. The numerus and the tempus of
the verbs make a sharp contrast. The change of numerus from ﬁrst person singular to
ﬁrst person plural connotes that Socrates acquired his companions throughout the di-
alogue, with whom he is able to go above. Socrates’ use of the future form in the last
sentence hints that a new philosophical journey is about to begin. But if this is so, who
is included in the ‘we’ who shall keep the upper path?
There is no deﬁnite answer to this question because Plato does not write about it.
However, if we recall that the Politeia begins with Socrates’ narration without referring
to whom he tells his story about ‘yesterday’, it seems reasonable to argue that “we” in
the last sentence includes not only Socrates’ interlocutors and the attendees there,36
but also the readers of the Politeia to whom Socrates tells his story from the viewpoint
of ‘today’. The one who prepares this setting is, needless to say, the author Plato. By
making the dialogue open-ended, Plato invites us, the readers of his dialogue, to a further
philosophical journey.
36 The dialogue attendees are not equal to the inter-
locutors of Socrates; that is, Glaucon, Adeimantus,
Thrasymachus, Polemarchus, and Cephalus. In ad-
dition to these interlocutors, ﬁve people are named
(Nicheratus at 327c2 and Lysias, Euthydemus, Char-
mantides, and Cleitophon at 328b4–7), although
there seems to be more people because Socrates says




This paper examined how Plato depicts philosophical inquiries as journeys of souls, us-
ing the ascent–descent motif. The Story of Er describes the journey to the afterlife of
Er’s soul as well as the journey of others’ souls with ascending and descending move-
ments. In the Allegory of the Cave, the liberation of the prisoners in the cave is pictured
with compulsory ascent and descent. The opening scene appears to be an allusion to the
Allegory of the Cave at ﬁrst sight, but our close examination revealed it has some pecu-
liarities that make Socrates’ descent to Piraeus different from the compulsory descent of
the liberated prisoners.
By means of the same motif, Plato on the one hand illustrates as philosophical jour-
neys all philosophical inquiries that bring people new perspectives about the world, but
on the other hand he tries to convey that we are also undertaking a philosophical journey
by reading his dialogue. We should not forget that Plato wrote the Politeia. Because it was
intended to be published, Plato wrote it with the awareness that it would have readers.37
The role of a messenger was handed down from Er to Socrates and Socrates passed on
the message to his interlocutors, especially Glaucon and Adeimantus within literature,
but also to his young friend Plato in the real world. Now Plato tries to pass the message
he received from Socrates to us, his readers. We open Plato’s books and read them, be-
cause we are “really delighted with the very old” philosophers and we think “one ought
to learn from them what sort of path” they have made (328d8–e2). The Politeia shows us
only one of numerous possible paths to knowledge. As the request of Cephalus triggered
the discussion led by Socrates, for us, the readers, the Politeia functions as an invitation
from Plato that brings us to the journey of our own souls. He provokes his readers to
participate in the dialectic and write a continuation of his dialogue.
37 It is well known that after Plato’s death people
found “a wax tablet with [the] ﬁrst words of the
Politeia written and rewritten in different arrange-
ments”. Burnyeat 1998, 4. Diogenes Laertius reports
this anecdote as follows: “Euphorion and Panaetius
relate that the beginning of the Politeia was found
several times revised and rewritten.” Hicks 1938, III.
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